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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

WINTERGREEN GROUP, LC, a Utah
Limited Liability Company,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,
:

Case No. 20060338-SC

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

:

BRJEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Wintergreen cannot bring a second action arising out of the same transactions
that are currently before the trial court in a prior lawsuit. The trial court correctly
dismissed this entire action as being in violation of Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The grant of a motion to dismiss presents a matter
of law, which this court reviews for correctness.*' Cook v. City of Moroni. 2005 UT App
40,15, 107 P.3d 713. See also Russell Packard Dev.. Inc. v. Carson. 2005 UT 14,^3, 108
P.3d 741 ("When reviewing the propriety of a motion to dismiss, we accept the factual
1

allegations in the complaint as true and interpret those facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party.").
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the Utah Department of
Transportation's motion to dismiss and the memorandum in support thereof. R. 32-33,
67-69, 102-03.
2. An Ex Parte Young action cannot be brought against the State of Utah or its
agencies. Such a claim can only be filed against officers or employees of the state. The
trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs three § 1983 claims based on the Utah
Department of Transportation's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Same as for Issue 1.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the Utah Department of
Transportation's motion to dismiss and the memorandum in support thereof. R. 32-33,
67, 100-01.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Appendix A to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
During March and April of 2004, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT)
filed three lawsuits seeking to condemn parts of several parcels of land owned by the
plaintiff. Wintergreen Group (Wintergreen). R. 21-22. Orders of Immediate Occupancy
in favor of UDOT were entered in all three condemnation actions on July 1, 2004. R. 2L
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34-63. The condemnation actions have since been consolidated into a single action. R.
178-80.
On March 18, 2005, Wintergreen filed this action. R. 1-24. The only defendant is
UDOT. R. 23-24. No state employees or officers were named as defendants. In its
complaint, Wintergreen stated six causes of action. The first three causes of action were
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the takings provision of the
Federal constitution. R. 17-20. a copy of the Complaint is attached hereto as Addendum
B. The last three causes of action allege violations of the takings provision of the Utah
constitution. R. 15-17. All of the claims raised by Wintergreen relate to the properties
that are the subjects of the previously filed condemnation actions. UDOT filed a motion
to dismiss on May 6, 2005. R. 31-71. The motion asked the trial court to dismiss this
action as duplicative of the condemnation proceedings because "[t]he matter should be
heard as a single action." R. 69. The motion also asked that the § 1983 claims be
dismissed because UDOT is not a person that can be sued under that statute. R. 67.
On March 6, 2006, the trial court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order
dismissing this action. R. 169-77, a copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order are
attached hereto as Addendum C. The trial court recognized that UDOT was asking that
all claims concerning the property in question should be decided in a single action and
that § 1983 did not apply to UDOT. R. 175 ("UDOT further claims Wintergreen *s
inverse condemnation action should be heard as a single action and that 42 U.S.C. § 1983

3

does not apply to states or state officials action in their official capacities."). The court
rejected plaintiffs claim that inverse condemnation claims were not based on the same
transaction or occurrence as were the condemnation actions. R. 172-74. The trial court
also found that § 1983 was not "applicable" to UDOT. R. 170.
Wintergreen filed its notice of appeal on March 31, 2006. R. 181-83.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The only facts relevant to the legal issues raised by this appeal are those found in
the Statement of the Case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wintergreen seeks to raise inverse condemnation claims in this action. All of its
claims relate to the three ongoing condemnation proceedings (since consolidated)
concerning certain tracts of land that it owns. These claims must be raised in the
condemnation proceeding and not, as here, in a separate action. Utah law requires that all
claims concerning the same transaction or occurrence be heard in a single action. Strong
public policy supports this rule. To permit damages to be decided for the same conduct
by two or more courts or juries would all too often lead to the entry of duplicative awards.
It also would raise the danger of inconsistent verdicts and decisions.
The State of Utah and its agencies, such as UDOT, are not "persons" that can be
sued under § 1983. Individual state officers can be sued for injunctive and prospective
declaratory relief pursuant to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). But the plaintiff has

4

sued only UDOT. Ex Parte Young does not apply to state agencies, but only to individual
employees of the state. Even if UDOT could be sued under § 1983, such a claim would
have to be raised either in the condemnation action or in a separate action filed after the
completion of the condemnation proceedings.
ARGUMENT
I. WINTERGREEN'S CLAIMS SHOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT
AS COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS IN THE CONDEMNATION
PROCEEDING
Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning compulsory
counterclaims, provides that:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time
of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. . . J
All of the plaintiffs claims arise out of the ongoing condemnation proceeding.
They are all part of a single transaction or occurrence. The gist of Wintergreen's action is
its claim that its constitutional rights will be violated by the condemnation action. The
trial court correctly dismissed this action as being in violation of this rule. "The purpose
of rule 13(a) is to ensure that all relevant claims arising out of a given transaction are
litigated in the same action/' Raile Family Trust v. Promax Dev. Co., 2001 UT 40, ^|12.

1

The omitted portions of the rule contain two exceptions that are not relevant to
this action.
5

24 P.3d 980 (contract, slander of title and tort claims should have been raised as
compulsory counterclaims in mechanics" lien action). Where a claim should have been
presented as a compulsory counterclaim and wasn't, it is forever barred. Todaro v.
Gardner. 285 P.2d 839, 842 (Utah 1955).
Campbell also asks that we remand this case to enable him to
establish his damages flowing from Kimball's alleged breach of the subject
contract. We decline to do so for two reasons. First, Campbellfs
counterclaim was compulsory under Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure because it arose out of the transaction that is the subject matter of
plaintiffs claim. Therefore, his failure to file a counterclaim resulted in a
waiver.
Kimball v. Campbell 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) (breach of contract claim waived
because it was not raised as a compulsory counterclaim to plaintiffs suit concerning a
breach of the same contract).
The same result was reached in Yanaka v. lomed. Inc.. 2005 UT App 239, 116
P.3d 962. Iomed brought an action against a former employee. Yanaka. In that action
lomed alleged that Yanaka had violated two agreements he had entered into while
employed with the company. Although he filed some counterclaims in Iomed's action,
Yanaka filed his claims of discriminatory employment practices as a separate action. The
court of appeals held that the discrimination claims should have been filed as
counterclaims to Iomed's lawsuit because they dealt with the same transaction or
occurrence: Yanaka's employment with lomed and the agreements between the parties.
Yanaka. 2005 UT App 239 at ffi|6-8.

6

Wintergreen's claims arise out of the condemnation process. As such they arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence as does the consolidated condemnation
proceeding and should have been raised in that action. The trial court correctly dismissed
these claims on this basis and its decision should be affirmed on appeal.
Notably, the trial court's decision in this matter does not totally preclude
Wintergreen from seeking to raise its claims in the condemnation proceeding.
Wintergreen can still seek to raise its claims as omitted counterclaims in the
condemnation proceeding. See Utah R. Civ. P. 13(e) (leave of court may be sought to
permit an amendment to add a counterclaim that was omitted).
II. WINTERGREEN'S FEDERAL CLAIMS CANNOT BE
BROUGHT AGAINST UDOT UNDER § 1983
As a matter of federal law, the State of Utah and its agencies are entitled to
absolute sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over suits by private
parties against a state. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida. 517 U.S. 44. 54-55 (1995). This
Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief
sought. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy. Inc.. 506 U.S. 139,
146 (1993); Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman. 465 U.S. 89. 100-01 (1984).
Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans we have understood the
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the
States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the
judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty; and that a
7

State will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has
consented to suit, either expressly or in the "plan of the convention."
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak. 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
Because of the State of Utah's sovereign immunity, no federal claim can be
brought against the state unless its immunity has been waived. Sovereign immunity can
be waived by Congress in certain circumstances, and by the states themselves.
Congress can waive the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity "by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Dellmuth v. Muth. 491 U.S.
223, 227-28 (1989). But the only time that Congress can waive Eleventh Amendment
immunity is when it is acting pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Green v. Mansour.
474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). The only congressional power that has been held, to date, to
validly authorize Congress to waive the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity is Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole Tribe of Fla, 517 U.S. at 59-63 (1996);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). If Congress does not have the authority
to waive the immunity of the states in federal court, it is without the power to waive their
immunity in state courts as well. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). Of most
importance to the present action is the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a
waiver of the immunity of the states. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979).
Nor can a state agency, such as UDOT, be sued under § 1983. In Will v. Michigan
Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the Supreme Court expressly held
that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under
8

§ 1983." This Court, following Will has also concluded that § 1983 claims cannot be
brought against state agencies because they are not "persons" under the statute. Ambus v.
Utah State Bd ofEduc. 858 P 2d 1372, 1376-77 (Utah 1993). The Utah Court of
Appeals has followed this Court and the United States Supreme Court in holding that
Utah and its agencies cannot be sued under § 1983:
Finally, Seare contends that the trial court erred m concluding that
the University and its agents were not "persons" who could be sued under
42 U.S C. § 1983 for civil rights violations. The United States Supreme
Court m Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109
S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), held that states cannot be sued in their
own courts for civil rights violations under section 1983. In Will, the Court
held that the state of Michigan and its police department could not be sued
m a Michigan state court for civil rights violations The Court stated that
"[i]t is an 'established principle of jurisprudence' that the sovereign cannot
be sued m its own courts without its consent We cannot conclude that
§ 1983 was intended to disregard the well established immunity of a State
from being sued without its consent." Further, the Court held that state
officials acting in their official capacity are not "persons" who may be sued
under section 1983.
In the instant case, Seare is suing the University of Utah School of
Medicine and a number of its employees. Under Utah law, the University
and its School of Medicine are state institutions Additionally, the state has
expressly declared that it maintains its immunity from civil rights claims.
Thus, the trial court was correct m ruling that the University of Utah School
of Medicine cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that its employees
acting m their official capacity, as is the case here, are not "persons" who
can be sued under section 1983
Seare v. Univ. of Utah, 882 P 2d 673. 679 (Utah App. 1994) (footnote and citations
omitted) See also Windward Partners v. Anvoshi 693 F 2d 928, 928-30 (9th Cir. 1982) (a
takings claim could not be brought under § 1983 against the state of Hawaii because of
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the Eleventh Amendment and plaintiffs suit against state officers for damages was really
a prohibited suit against the state).
Because Congress has not waived the immunity of Utah for a § 1983 claim, no
such cause of action can exist unless Utah has waived its own immunity. While the states
can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity, such waivers will not be inferred easily.
The United States Supreme Court has said: "we will find waiver only where stated 'by the
most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave
no room for any other reasonable construction.5" Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida. 450
U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 65U 673 (1974)). A state
does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting a statute authorizing suits
against the state in its own courts. Id. Utah, far from waiving its sovereign immunity, has
expressly stated in the Governmental Immunity Act that its immunity is retained for
injuries arising out of connected with, or resulting from a violation of civil rights. Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(b) (West Supp. 2006).
The cases relied upon by Wintergieen in claiming it can sue the state and its
agencies do not involve § 1983 claims against the states. Most of them deal with suits
against state officials and not the state.2 Others are appeals from state supreme courts on

2

Lingle v. Chevron USA. Inc.. 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (suit against governor and
attorney general); Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (suit against
non-profit organization and officials): Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedict's.
480 U.S. 470 (1987) (suit against state officials); Webb*s Fabulous Pharmacies. Inc. v.
Beckwrth, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (suit against county and officials).
10

claims other than those asserted under § 1983.3 The remaining two decisions deal with
actions against the United States4 and against the City of Chicago.5
Nor does Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), help the plaintiff. Wintergreen
erroneously claims it can sue UDOT under Ex Parte Young. Appellant's Opening Brief
at 16-17. But Ex Parte Young involved a suit against a state official for prospective relief
only. This exception permits suits against individual state officers in certain
circumstances, but not against the states or their agencies. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe
of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997) ("The Tribe's suit, accordingly, is barred by Idaho's
Eleventh Amendment immunity unless it falls within the exception this Court has
recognized for certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers
in their individual capacities.") (citation omitted). As this Court noted in Ambus, officials
can be sued for injunctive relief because such claims are not treated as being against the
state. Ambus, 858 P.2d at 1376. In Couer d'Alene, the court found Idaho to be immune
from suit. It then considered whether an Ex Parte Young action could be brought against
individual state officers. Couer d'Alene. 521 U.S. at 269-88.
The same result was reached in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
Maryland, 535 U.S. 635 (2002). Petitioners had brought their action against a state
3

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comnrn, 483 U.S. 825(1987).
4

Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).

5

Chicago. B. & O. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).

n

commission and its members. The Court decided it did not need to determine if the
commission had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, because an Ex Parte Young
action had been properly brought against the members of the commission and only
prospective relief was sought. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645. ("Whether the Commission
waived its immunity is another question we need not decide, because - as the same parties
also argue - even absent waiver, Verizon may proceed against the individual
commissioners in their official capacities, pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young.").
In a final effort to support its federal claims, Wintergreen claims that it can litigate
its federal takings claims in this separate action. Opening Brief of Appellant at 41. To
support this claim, plaintiff relies on San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 125 S.Ct. 2491 (2005). Rather than create a right to file a
separate action to litigate a federal takings claim, San Remo only continued the prior
understanding that a federal claim could be raised in the same action brought by the state
to condemn the private property.
The requirement that aggrieved property owners must seek "compensation
through the procedures the State has provided for doing so." does not
preclude state courts from hearing simultaneously a plaintiffs request for
compensation under state law and the claim that, in the alternative, the
denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.
San Remo. 125 S.Ct. At 2506 (citation omitted). The procedure provided by Utah is the
condemnation proceeding. The trial court can hear plaintiffs federal takings claims
simultaneously to determining the condemnation claims. It continues to be federal law
12
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that a Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe until after "just compensation" has been
denied in the state proceeding. Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank. 473 U.S. 172, 186,
193(1985).
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, UDOT asks this Court to affirm the trial couifs
decision dismissing this action and leaving the plaintiff free to raise any constitutional
claims it might have in the consolidated condemnation action.
Respectfully submitted this ^ O

day of August, 2006.

Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant - Appellee
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ADDENDUM "A

Article I, Section 22. (Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.
Rule 13. COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM.
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the
claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another
pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or
other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule
13.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim
against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim.
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or may not
diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim relief
exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading of the opposing
party.
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either
matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, with the
permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading.
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave
of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim
by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any
property that is the subject-matter of the original action. Such cross-claim may include a
claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant
for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties other
than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the
determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in
as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained.
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be
rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the opposing

party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross demands
have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one had brought an action
against the other, a counterclaim could have been set up. the two demands shall be
deemed compensated so far as they equal each other, and neither can be deprived of the
benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision
(j) of this rule.
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to negotiable
instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim which could have been asserted against an assignor at the time of or before notice
of such assignment, may be asserted against his assignee, to the extent that such claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee.
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

WINTERGREEN GROUP, LC, a Utah
Limited Liability Company.

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
v.

Jury Trial Demanded

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Case No. Q g r > 3 p O ^

|

Judge: Q.^AaW

/V.S&vJL

Defendant.

Plaintiff by and through its undersigned counsel of record hereby alleges as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) because this is a civil

matter not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
2. This Court is the proper venue for this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1,
because this action involves real property in Tooele County, and pursuant to § 78-13-7 because it
arises in Tooele County.
PARTIES
3. Plaintiff Wintergreen Group, LC is a Utah limited liability company doing business in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
4. Defendant State of Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") is the Utah state entity
with general responsibility for state transportation systems pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-1201(1).
BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS
5. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff owned several parcels of land in Tooele located on
the west and east sides of State Road 36 (SR-36), between 2000 North and 2400 North Streets
(hereinafter "Plaintiffs lands"). Such lands consisted of a total of approximately 121.116 acres.
(Plaintiffs lands are depicted on a portion of the Tooele Master Transportation Plan Map attached
hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.)
6. At all times relevant herein, UDOT has been engaged in a project to widen SR-36 and to
conduct ancillary construction and improvements encompassing an area that includes the vicinity
of Plaintiff s lands (hereinafter "UDOT SR-36 Project").
7. Prior to the UDOT SR-36 Project, Plaintiff intended to use all its lands, both on the west
2

and east sides of SR-36, for construction of the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated
economic unit.
8. On March 305 2004, UDOT served Plaintiff with summons and a complaint for
condemnation in Case Number 040300459 (hereinafter "the 459 condemnation lawsuit"), in which
UDOT sought to condemn fee title to a strip of land of .275 acres belonging to Plaintiff located on
the east side SR-36, along 2400 North Street. (A map showing the parcel is attached hereto as
Exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference.)
9.

On April 15, 2004. UDOT served Plaintiff with summons and a complaint for

condemnation in Case Number 040300524 (hereinafter "the 524 condemnation lawsuit"), in which
UDOT sought to condemn several parts of a 16.666-acre parcel of land owned by Plaintiff located
on the east side of SR-36, bordered by 2000 North on the south, 400 East on the east, and 2200
North on the north (hereinafter "the East Side land"). The 524 condemnation lawsuit sought to
condemn fee title to two parcels of the land, together comprising 2.183 acres, one perpetual
easement of .111 acres, and three temporary easements amounting to .022 acres. (A map showing
the location of Plaintiff s East Side land subject to the 524 condemnation lawsuit is attached hereto
as Exhibit C and incorporated herein by reference.)
10. Also on April 15, 2004, UDOT served Plaintiff with summons and a complaint for
condemnation in Case Number 040300525 (hereinafter "the 525 condemnation lawsuit"), in which
UDOT sought to condemn fee title to a strip of land of 2.147 acres belonging to Plaintiff located on
the west side SR-36. along the boundaries of four adjacent parcels of land owned by Plaintiff which
3

collectively amounted to 104.175 acres (hereinafter "the West Side land"). (A map showing the
location of Plaintiff s West Side land subject to the 525 condemnation lawsuit is attached hereto as
Exhibit D and incorporated herein by reference.)
11. On July 1,2004. the trial court entered an Order of Immediate Occupancy in each of the
459, 524 and 525 condemnation lawsuits.
12. As a proximate result of the UDOT SR-36 Project, all of Plaintiffs lands have been
reduced to one 14.483-acre parcel on the east side of SR-36-subject to one perpetual easement and
three temporary easements-and four adjacent parcels along the west side of SR-36 consisting of
102.028 acres (hereinafter collectively "Plaintiffs remaining lands").
13. As a proximate result of the UDOT SR-36 Project, Plaintiffs lands have been reduced
in total size to 116.511 acres, and such remaining lands also are subject to the perpetual easement
and three temporary easements resulting from the 524 condemnation lawsuit.
14. As a proximate result of the UDOT SR-36 Project, UDOT permanently blocked off
traffic between SR-36 and 2000 North Street, which borders the southern boundary of Plaintiffs
remaining East Side land located on the east side of SR-36.
15. As proximate result of the UDOT SR-36 Project, UDOT condemned 2200 North in the
524 condemnation lawsuit, but rendered 2200 North only a right-in, right-out street in relation to
SR-36.
16. As a proximate result of UDOT's blocking of 2000 North, in conjunction with UDOT's
rendering of 2200 North as a right-in. right-out street in relation to SR-36, Plaintiffs access to
4

southbound SR-36 from its remaining East Side land is unreasonably restricted to traveling east on
2000 North or 2200 North to 400 East, then north to 2400 North, and then finally south on SR-36.
17. Although UDOT condemned and opened 2200 North as part of the UDOT SR-36
Project, UDOT did not open 2200 North going westward from SR-36 toward the Overlake
Subdivision located immediately west of Plaintiff s remaining West Side land, as anticipated by the
Tooele Master Transportation Plan.
18. As a proximate result of UDOT's condemnation of part of Plaintiffs lands; UDOT's
failure to open 2200 North westbound from SR-36; UDOT's rendering of 2200 North as a right-in,
right-out street in relation to SR-36; and UDOT's blocking of 2000 North from traffic in relation to
SR-36, all of Plaintiffs remaining lands have been isolated from each other, Plaintiff has been
prevented from developing its lands into the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated
economic unit, and Plaintiffs remaining lands have been substantially diminished in value.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
Inverse Condemnation Through Partial Taking
- U.S. Const., Amend 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
19. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth
above.
20. Defendant UDOT through the UDOT SR-36 Project imposed substantial economic harm
on Plaintiffs remaining lands, Plaintiff has demanded compensation for such harm, and UDOT
refuses to pay such compensation.
21. Such conduct by UDOT was undertaken under color of state law and was implementing
5

official custom and policy.
22. Such conduct by UDOT constitutes a partial taking of Plaintiff s property.
23. Such conduct by UDOT was undertaken for the public use of widening SR-36 for the
benefit of the public.
24. Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional right to be
free from a partial taking of its property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C Section 1983.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
Inverse Condemnation Through Categorical Total Taking
- U.S. Const., Amend 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
25. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth
above.
26. Defendant UDOT through the UDOT SR-36 Project imposed substantial economic harm
on Plaintiffs remaining lands, Plaintiff has demanded compensation for such harm, and UDOT
refuses to pay such compensation.
27. Such conduct by UDOT was undertaken under color of state law and was implementing
official custom and policy.
28. Such conduct by UDOT constitutes a categorical total taking of the reduction in value
of Plaintiffs remaining lands resulting from UDOT's conduct.
29. Such conduct by UDOT was undertaken for the public use of widening SR-36 for the
benefit of the public.
6

30 Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional right to be
free from a categorical total taking of its property without just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U S C Section 1983.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
ln>erse Condemnation Thiough Not Substantially
Ad^ancing a Legitimate Go\ernmental Objective
- U.S. Const., Amend 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
31 Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth
above
32 Defendant UDOT through the UDOT SR-36 Project imposed substantial economic harm
on Plaintiffs remaining lands, Plaintiff has demanded compensation for such harm, and UDOT
refuses to pay such compensation
33 Such conduct by UDOT w as undertaken under color of state law and was implementing
official custom and policy
34

Such conduct by UDOT was undertaken m pursuit of the legitimate governmental

objective of widening SR-36 for the benefit of the public
35 Such conduct by UDOT did not substantially advance such legitimate governmental
objective because UDOT engaged in excessive condemnation, failed to open 2200 North westbound
from SR-36, rendered 2200 North as a right-m, nght-out street m relation to SR-36, and blocked
2000 North from traffic m relation to SR-36
36 As a proximate result of UDOT's conduct all of Plaintiff s remaining lands have been
7

isolated from each other, Plaintiff has been prevented from developing its lands into the North Town
Shopping Center as an integrated economic unit, and Plaintiffs remaining lands have been
substantially diminished in value.
37. Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional right to be
free from a taking of its property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
Inverse Condemnation Taking of Property - Destruction or Materia] Lessening of Value
Utah Constitution Art. I, § 22
38. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth
above.
39. UDOT's conduct substantially interfered with and destroyed or materially lessened the
value of Plaintiffs remaining lands.
40. Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs constitutional right to be free from a taking
of its property without just compensation under Utah Constitution Article I. Section 22.
41. Such conduct by UDOT constitutes a taking without just compensation of Plaintiffs
property for the benefit of the public.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
Inverse Condemnation Taking of Property - Use and Enjoyment Abridged or Destroyed
Utah Constitution Art. 1, § 22
42. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth
above.
8

43. UDOT's conduct in substantial degree abridged or destroyed Plaintiffs right to use and
enjoyment of Plaintiffs remaining lands.
44. Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs constitutional right to be free from a taking
of its property without just compensation under Utah Constitution Article I, Section 22.
45. Such conduct by UDOT constitutes a taking without just compensation of Plaintiffs
property for the benefit of the public.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
Inverse Condemnation Through Damaging of Property - Utah Constitution Art. I, § 22
46. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth
above.
47. UDOT through the physical conduct of failure to open 2200 North westbound from SR36, rendering of 2200 North as a right-in, right-out street in relation to SR-36, and blocking of 2000
North from traffic in relation to SR-36, destroyed Plaintiffs right to develop its remaining lands into
the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated economic unit, which gave Plaintiffs remaining
lands additional value.
48. UDOT's conduct caused Plaintiff special damage in excess of that sustained by the
public generally because Plaintiffs remaining East Side land was rendered isolated from Plaintiffs
remaining West Side land, as well as from the areas surrounding Plaintiffs remaining East Side land,
because Plaintiff no longer has access to or from SR-36 on 2000 North, and has no access to
southbound SR-36 from 2200 North, but instead must travel a circuitous route eastward on 2000
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North or 2200 North, then north on 400 East, then finally south on SR-36.
49. Such damage sustained by Plaintiff is a definite physical injury cognizable to the senses
because Plaintiffs remaining lands are isolated from each other as well as from SR-36 to a
substantial degree.
50. Such damage sustained by Plaintiff has a perceptible effect on the present market value
of Plaintiff s remaining lands because all of such lands have been isolated from each other, Plaintiff
has been prevented from developing its lands into the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated
economic unit, and Plaintiffs remaining lands have been substantially diminished in value.
51. Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs constitutional right to be free from a
damaging of its property without just compensation under Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 22.
52. Such conduct by UDOT constitutes a damaging without just compensation of Plaintiff s
property for the public use of widening SR-36 for the benefit of the public.
53. Plaintiff demands jury trial upon all issues so triable, and hereby tenders the jury fee to
the Clerk of the Court.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE. Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
a) For Plaintiffs inverse condemnation damages, in a sum of not less than four million
Dollars ($4,000,000.00). or such greater or lesser sum as determined at trial;
b) For interest on Plaintiffs inverse condemnation damages from July 1, 2004, the date of
the Orders of Immediate Occupancy in the three condemnation lawsuits;
10

c) For plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs, in the sum of one hundred fifty thousand dollars
($ 150,000.00), plus interest to date of payment, or such other greater or lesser sum as the Court may
find reasonable and proper;
d) For an injunction:
i) mandating Defendant UDOT to open 2200 North westbound from SR-36; to render
2200 North as a four-way intersection at SR-36, with appropriate traffic signal devices; to remove
the obstruction of 2000 North from traffic to and from SR-36 northbound and southbound;
ii) prohibiting Defendant UDOT from construction on the UDOT Project that will
prevent implementation of this court's mandatory injunction;
iii) requiring that Plaintiff provide appropriate security pursuant to Rule 65A(c)(l)
as determined by the court for purposes of such injunctive relief; and
c) For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
DATED this ^ P

day of March, 2005.

NICK J. CO^ESSIDES
Attorney vox Plaintiff

Plaintiff in this action:
Wintergreen Group LC
c/o Butch Johnson
P.O.Box 161
Lehi,UT 84043-0161
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WINTERGREEN GROUP, LC, a
Utah L i m i t e d L i a b i l i t y
Company,
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Case

Plaintiff,

No.

Judge

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

050300341

RANDALL N.

SKANCHY

|
|

Defendant

The

above

matter

came

before

the Court

Defendant Utah Department of Transportation's

for oral

argument

on

(UDOT) Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff Wmtergreen Group LC ("Wmtergreen") was represented by Nick
J.

Colessides

Transportation

and

John

Martinez,

and

the

Utah

Department

of

("UDOT") was represented by Randy S. Hunter.
BACKGROUND

Wmtergreen filed this action alleging s±x total causes of action.
The causes of action essentially claim inverse condemnation under the 5tY
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as well as Article I § 22 of the Utah Constitution.
Wmtergreen owns several parcels of land totaling 121.116 acres
Tooele locatea on the west
between 2000 North and 2400

and east siaes

of State

Road

36

m

(SR-36)

North Streets (hereinafter "Wmtergreen's
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lands") .

UDOT

is

engagea
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in

a project
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to

widen

improvements in the area of Wmtergreen' s lands.

SR-36

and

other

As part of the SR-36

project UDOT initiated conaemnation proceedings on three different pieces
of Wmtergreen's lands m

March ana April of 2004.

Each piece is the

subject of its own condemnation lawsuit filed in this Court.

On July 1,

2004 this Court enterea an Order of Immediate Occupancy in each of the
three condemnation lawsuits.
As a result of the UDOT SR-36 project, Wmtergreen

alleges its

properties have been reduced by a total size of 4.605 acres and that such
taking has artificially

from each other

thereby

interfering with Wmtergreen's development of the property as

a whole

unit.

severed

the parcels

In addition, Wmtergreen alleges UDOT's control of traffic around

Wmtergreen's lands has further isolated Wmtergreen's three parcels from
each other, thereby preventing Wmtergreen from developing its lands into
an integrated project it refers to as the North Town Shopping Center.
Hence, Wmtergreen claims its remaining lands have been substantially
diminished in value and that the only way to address such an impact is
by inverse condemnation.
In its Motion to Dismiss, UDOT claims an inverse condemnation action
is inappropriate in this case because inverse ccndemnation is used when
a public entity takes private property without formal exercise of eminent
aomam power, which does not exist here. UDOT had initiated condemnation
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proceedings,
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as previously noted.

MEMORANDUM

OPINION

UDOT further claims Wintergreen's

inverse condemnation action should be heard as a single action and that
42 U.S.C. § 1983 does

not apply to states or state officials acting in

their official capacities.

Finally, UDOT claims the inverse condemnation

claims are not ripe for adjudication because Wintergreen has failed to
exhaust its remedies through the condemnation action.
Wintergreen's

opposition

to UDOT's Motion

argues that the only

vehicle to address the resulting harm to Wintergreen's entire property
is through inverse condemnation proceedings.

Wintergreen further claims

UDOT has not properly identified the relevant property at issue in its
separate suits, tnus making this action necessary.
claims its action is different

Wintergreen further

from UDOT's because UDOT's action is

statutory where as Wintergreen's claim is constitutional. Wintergreen
also claims the basis for its claims is not § 1983.

Instead, § 1983 only

provides

claims, but

Amendment

the
and

remedies
tiie

for Wintergreen' s federal

doctrine

of

Wintergreen's substantive rights.
of action is ripe.

Ex

Parte

Young

are

the

the 5tJ~

source

of

Finally, Wintergreen claims its cause

Specifically, it alleges the state claims are ripe

for adjudication because only available administrative remedies need be
exhausted.
DISCUSSION
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss accepts as true the facts alleged
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in the complaint but challenge*- the party's right to relief based on
Oakwood

those facts.
(2004).

Vill.

L.L.C.

v.

Alberstons,

Inc.,

2004 UT 101 J 8

The purpose of a motion to dismiss "is to challenge the formal

sufficiency

of the claim

for relief, not to establish

resolve the merits of a case."

Whipple

910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996).

v.

American

Fork

the facts or

Irrigation

Co.,

"A dismissal is a severe measure and

should be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is
not entitled to relief unaer any state of facts which could be proved in
support of its claim." Colman

v

Utah

State

Land

Bd. , 795 P.2d 622, 624

(Utah 1990).
Wmtergreen's first three claims are based on the 5th Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States of America and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The 5th Amendment

applies to the states through

Wmtergreen' s fourth, fifth, ana sixth claims
Constitution Art

I, §22.

the 14th Amendment.

are based on the Utah

Wmtergreen argues this inverse conaemnation

action brought under the state and federal constitutions is different
from the condemnation actions because it encompasses all of Wmtergreen's
lands and because it is grounoed on principles of constitutional right
instead

of

legislative

grace.

Wmtergreen

claims

that

filing

a

condemnation action under the state statutory scheme does not preclude
the

filing

of

a

Colman v. Utah State

constitutional

inverse

condemnation

action,

citing

Lano Bd. , 705 P.2d 622, 634 (Utah 1990) (Colman),

ana
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v.

City

of Tigard,
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512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (Dolan)

, to support this

However, Wmtergreen' s reliance on Colman

proposition.

and Dolan

is

misguided.
In Colman,
breach

m

a causeway

flooding.
breach.

the government, through an act of Congress, created a
across the Great

Salt Lake

to prevent

serious

Plaintiff ownea a canal that was destroyed because of the
The government did not file a condemnation action.

Plaintiff

filed an inverse conaemnation action unoer the Utah State Constitution
seeking just compensation for the damage to his property.

The Court held

an inverse condemnation action under Article I §22 is not subject to the
limitations found m

the Governmental Immunity Act.

The court did not

find that had the government filed a condemnation suit a constitutional
violation would still exist allowing the plaintiff to file an inverse
condemnation action claiming a constitutional violation.

Dolan

fails for

the same reason.
Wmtergreen
condemnation

has

action

not

was

cited

filed

a

after

single
the

case

where

government

an

agency

inverse
filed

a

condemnation action seeking to take the property in exchange for just
compensation.

Instead, m

every case citea t>y Wmtergreen the government

enactea some regulation diminishing the value of the private property
without ever filing a conaemnation action.

In these cases, Wmtergreen

filed an inverse condemnation action to enforce their rights in the face
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of already pending condemnation actions.
The Court finds an inverse condemnation action is inappropriate in
this case.

The Utah Code provides the statutory framework for parties

to seek rearess for the exercise of eminent domain.

Utah Code § 78-34-10

provides broad remedies of recovery for damages, including

severance

aamages to remaining parcels of lana affected by the exercise of eminent
domain. The proper procedural action to force the government to pay just
compensation for damages to the entire property and not just the three
individual parcels is to consolidate

the three conaemnation actions,

which the Court orders on its own motion.
to

dismiss

all

claims

based

on

the

The Court grants the motion

arguments

of

state

or

federal

constitution remeaies, as such remedies are provided by statute.
Wmtergreen further claims the inverse action is separate from the
condemnation

suits

because

it

allows

for

damages, namely attorneys' fees, under §1983.

different

calculation

of

The Utah courts have not

directly addressed this issue, however, tne Court of Appeals of Georgia
was faced with a similar claim made unaer § 1983 in a takings case.

The

property owners claimeo the taking of tneir property constituted a taking
unaer color of right by the state ana deprived them of their rights,
privileoes and immunities under the Constitution violating 42 U.S.C. §
1983.

The Court found a taking which is no more than an ordinary legal

action by the Department of Transportation to taKe property in accordance
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with the statutes of the state is not enough to convert the action into
a

civil

rights

violation,

so

as

to

allow

for

attorneys'

fees,

particularly when the property owners have not objected to the propriety
of

the

taking

Department
See

also

of

but

just

Transp.,

to the amount

of

compensation.

Jackson

v.

159 Ga. App. 130, 283 S.E.2d 59 (Ga.App., 1981);

3-8 Nichols on Eminent Domain @ 8.01.

Furthermore, the

Jackson

Court also noted the long established law that states that attorneys'
fees are not a part of condemnation actions.

In Utah, attorneys' fees

are likewise not provided for in the statute for damages, U.C.A. § 78-3410.
Wmtergreen claims § 1983 provides the remedies for its federal
claims

ana

is

not

the

basis

of

its

feaeral

claims.

Instead,

Wmtergreen' s feaeral claims are based on the 5t)r Amendment and come under
the doctrine of Ex Parte

Young.

However, the Court is persuaded by the

Georgia Court of Appeals' reasoning m

Jackson.

The Court finds this is

an ordinary exercise of the power of eminent domain by UDOT and a claim
for attorneys' fees is inappropriate because the law does not provide for
such relief in this instance.
Wmtergreen claims it is entitled to an injunction stopping UDOT
from controlling
property.
Salt

Lake

traffic in such a manner as to limit access

In Colman
City

v.

v. Utah

Young,

State

Land

Bd. , 795 P.2d at 622

to its
(quoting

45 Utah 349, 362, 145 F. 1047, 1051 (1915)), the

WINTERGREEN GROUP V. UDOT

PAGE 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Supreme Court of Utah held that u a landowner cannot complain because he
is inconvenienced in the use of his property, where such inconvenience
arises out of the proper enforcement of the police power to protect the
public health, and where such enforcement does not amount to a taking or
destruction of his property."

The Court finds that Wintergreen has not

alleged sufficient facts to show that control of the flow of traffic
rises to the level of a taking of property.

It may be an inconvenience

to drive a few extra blocks around the property when entering it, but it
is not a taking.
public

by

UDOT has the very important task of protecting the

controlling

traffic

especially

in

construction

zones.

Furthermore, Wintergreen's injunction is reliant on § 1983, which the
Court has found is not applicable in this case, and should be dismissed
on this basis as well.
The Court GRANTS UDOT's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and orders
the three condemnation suits, 040300459, 040300524, 040300525, against
Wintergreen be consolidatea.
Orderea this day

J>*

Mr. Hunter to prepare the Order.
of Marcn, 2006.

<-^
=
^ r
RANDALL N. S K A N C l i I _ _ >

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

WINTERGREEN GROUP V. UDOT

PAGE 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Opinion, to the following, this
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John Martinez
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Nick J. Colessides
Attorney for Plaintiff
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Randy Hunter
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